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[L. A. No. 29615. In Bank. Apr. 15, 1969.]

RAY C. HOLMES et a1., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DAVID
H. BRICKER, INC., Defendant and Respondent.
[1] Actions-Splitting of Causes of Action-Application of Rule.
-Under the rule that all damages for a single breach of
contract must be recovered in one action, a single breach of an
express warranty, essentially contractual in character, created
by agreement of the parties, not arising by operation of law, and
subject to negotintion and modification iLt the time the contract was entered into, did not give rise to two causes of
action when it resulted in injury to both person and property;
and in an action to recover damages for injury to an automobile based on such a warranty of good operating condition in
the purchase agreement, the trial court properly sustained
defendant's demurrer without leave to amend, where it
appeared that the breach of warranty alleged was the identical breach of express contractual warranty alleged in the first
cause of action in a five-cause-of-nction complaint in a prior
suit for personal injuries in which the plaintiffs secured judgment, and identical thereto except for the damages alleged.
[1] Simultaneous injury to person and property as giving rise to
single cause of action, note, 62 A.L.B..2d 977. See also Cal.Jur.2d,
Actions, § 75 et seq j Am.Jur.2d, Actions, § 135 et seq.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Actions, Proceedings and Remedies,
§ 73.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the
Los Angeles Judicial District of Los Angeles County. Alan G.
Campbell, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for property damage arising out of an automobile
accident. Judgment of dismissal after demurrer was sustained
without leave to amend affirmed.
Ira Jacoves, Gilbert, Thompson & Kelly and Jean Wunderlich for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Dulaney W. Palmer for Defendant and Respondent.

)

TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiffs brought this action in the
municipal court to recover damages for injury to their automobile. The court sustained· defendant's demurrer to the
complaint without leave to amend on the ground that the
action was barred by a judgment plaintiffs had obtained for
personal injuries suffered in the same accident. Plaintiffs
appeal from the ensuing judgment of dismissal,1
On August 24, 1962, plaintiffs purchased a used automobile
from defendant. The contract of sale contained an express
warranty that" The used car sold herein is hereby warranted
to be in good operatin~ondition and to remain in such condition under normal ~and service for a period of 30 days or
1000 miles, (whichever comes first) after delivery." On September 15, 1962, while Mr. Holmes was driving and Mrs.
Holmes was riding as a passenger, the automobile crashed into
a fixed object along a downgrade on a mountain road, causing
injuries to plaintiffs and damage to the automobile.
On September 6, 1963, plaintiffs filed an action against
defendant in the superior court to recover damages for their
personal injuries. Their complaint pleaded five causes of
action, each of which alleged that the accident was caused by
defective brakes. The first cause of action sought recovery for
breach of the express warranty quoted above; the second
alleged breach of other express warranties and of the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for the purpose
intended; the third alleged defendant's failure to test and
adjust the brakes as required by Vehicle Code section 24007;
the fourth alleged negligent servicing, testing, and inspecting;
IPlaintiffs' motion to reconsider was denied, and the jUdgment of dismissal was affirmed by the appellate department of the superior court
and by the Court of Appeal upon certification of the cause to that court
Wlder nIle 63 (n) of the California Rules of Court.
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and the fifth sought recovery on the basis of fraudulent representation that the automobile was in good condition.
On March 9, 1967, a jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs
for $49,400, and the judgment entered on the verdict has
become final.
On February 23, 1966, while the personal injury action was
pending, plaintiffs filed this action against defendant in the
municipal court for $1,138.12, the amount of damage to the
automobile in the 1962 accident. The complaint pleaded two
causes of action. The first was based on the express warranty
in the purchase agreement. It was identical with the first
cause of action in the 1963 personal injury complaint except
for the damages alleged. The second sought recovery on the
basis of fraudulent misrepresentations. It was dismissed by
stipulation and thereafter the court sustained defendant's
demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend, on the
ground that "Plaintiff could and should have urged in the
Superior Court action, the claim that is now made in the first
cause of action. "
Plaintiff contends that the trial court's ruling is contrary
to the settled rule that conduct that simultaneously causes
harm both to the person and to the property of one individual
gives rise to two separate and distinct causes of action, one
for violation of the right to freedom from legally impermissible interference with the integrity of the person and one for
violation of the right to quiet enjoyment of property. This
application of the primary rights theory of causes of action in
California was first reflected in the permissive joinder provisions of the practice act of 1851 based on the original Field
Code. (Stats. 1851, ch. 5, § 64, pp. 59-60.) 2 Those provisions
distinguished between causes of action arising out of injuries
to person and causes of action arising out of injuries to property and did not recognize any cause of action that would
include tortious injuries to both person and property. AI.
2" The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same complaint, when they all arise out of:
"lat. Contracts, express or implied; or,
"2d. Claims to recover specific real property ..• or,
"3d. Claims to recover specific personal property • • • Of,
, '4th. Claims against a trustee, by virtue of a contract, or by operation of law; or,
"5th. Injuries to character; or,
"6th. Injuries to person; or,
, '7th. Injuries to property. But the causes of action 80 united shall all
belong to one only of these classes, and shall affect all the parties to the
action, and not require different places of trial, and shall be separately
stated. "
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though the Legislature has broadened the scope of permissible
joinder of causes of action since 1851, it has consistently
recognized, both in the joinder provisions (see, e.g., Code Civ.
I'roc., § 427; Stats. 1915, ch. 28, § 1, p. 30; Stats. 1855, ch. 155,
§ 4, pp. 196-197) and in the applicable statutes of limitation
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 340.3 linjury to person] and 338.3
[injury to property]) that the causes of action for injuries to
person and property are separate. The cases and the commentators are in accord. (Todhunter v. Smith (1934) 219 Cal
690, 693 (dictum) [28 P.2d 916] ; Bowman v. Wohlke (1913)
166 Cal 121 [135 P. 37, Ann. Cas. 1915B 1011]; Lamb v.
Harbaugh (1895) 105 Cal 680 [39 P. 56] ; McCarty v. Fremont (1863) 23 Cal. 196; Morgan v. French (1945) 70 Cal
App.2d 785, 787 (dictum) [161 P.2d 800] ; Pratt v. Vaughan
(1934) 2 Cal.App.2d 722 [38 P.2d 799] ; Ross v. Goins (1921)
51 Cal.App. 412 [197 P. 132] ; Weisshand v. City of Petaluma
(1918) 37 CalApp. 296, 302 [174 P.955] ; Schermerhorn v.
Los AngeZes Pac. R.R. Co. (1912) 18 Cal.App. 454 [123 P.
351] ; see 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) Judgment § "64(b) ;
Toelle, Joinder of Actions With Special Reference to the
Montana and California Practice (1930) 18 Cal.L.Rev. 459,
468; (1952) 4O~al.L.ReV, 412, 416; (1948) 1 Stan.L.Rev.
156; (1935) 23 al.L.Rev. 101, 101-103; (1929) 3 So.Cal.L.
Rev. 63, 64; 29
l.Jur.2d Judgments (1956) § 259, p. 226;
Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 977, 1001, 1005; Annot., 64 A.L.R.
663, 670; Al}.not., 47 A.L.R. 536, 538; 51 L.R.A. 319 (1914).)
Kidd v. Hillman (1936) 14 Cal.App.2d 507 [58 P.2d 662],
Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Winfield (1938) 24 Cal.App.
"2d 477 [75 P.2d 525], and Pacific Indem. Group v. Dunton
(1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 504 [52 CalRptr. 332], invoked by
defendant, are not to the contrary. In each of these cases a
former judgment had included recovery for both personal
injuries and property damage growing out of an automobile
accident and the court recognized that the former judgment
could be pleaded as a defense to a later action for additional
property damage. Accordingly, they involved only the application of the settled rule that a separate cause of action does
not arise for each separate item of property damaged as a
result of one tortious act. (Sanderson v. Niemann (1941) 17
Ca1.2d 563,572 [110 P.2d 1025].)
[1] In the present case, however, plaintiffs have not
pleaded a cause of action for tortious injury to their automobile, but for breach of the express written warranty in the
eontr&!t of sale. The breaeh alleged is the identieal breaeh of

warranty alleged in their first cause of action in the prior suit.
Accordingly, the crucial question is whether a single breach of
the express warranty gave rise to two causes of action when it
resulted in injury to both the persons and the property of·
plaintiffs. We hold that it did not. The warranty pleaded in
this case was essentially contractual in character. It was
created by agreement of the parties; it did not arise by operation of law; and it was subject to negotiation and modification at the time the contract was entered into. Under these
circumstances the applicable rule is that all damages for a
single breach of contract must be recovered in one action.
(Coughlin v. Blair (1953) 41 Cal.2d 587, 598 [262 P.2d 305] ;'
. Abbot v. 76 Land cf4 Water Co. (1911) 161 Cal. 42 [118 P.
425]; see 4 Corbin on Contracts (1951) §§ 946,948 and 955; 1
Williston on Sales (rev. ed. 1948) .§ 197; Rest., Contracts,
§ 327, (b); see also, Proctor v. Southern Cal. Ryo Coo (1900)
130 Cal. 20 [62 Po 306,509] ; Jones v. 80 So Cortes (1861) 17
. Cal. 487 [79 Am.Dec.142]0)
The judgment is affirmed.
McComb, JOt Peters, Jo, Tobriner, Jo, Mosk, Jo, Burke, Jo,
and Sullivan, J., concurred.
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